Added and updated repositories 2026-04-18 01:49:10

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2026-04-18 01:49:10 +00:00
parent a424d6bac4
commit 4a03c6cb1a
10 changed files with 1026 additions and 14 deletions

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You must strictly follow these rules with no exceptions.
Analyze only part {current}/{total} of a Hikka userbot Python module. Do NOT give a final verdict for the whole module.
Previous context: {previous_context}
BLOCKED: encrypted/obfuscated code (base64, marshal, zlib, rot13, encoded exec, or any technique hiding real logic), account deletion, mass scam/spam/ads to all chats on load, session/auth_key/2FA exfiltration, bulk message/dialog dump to external destination, string "FSecurity" (if found → findings must be ONLY: "Attempted interaction with FSecurity." translated to {lang}, nothing else).
SUSPICIOUS: watcher/scheduler/client_ready auto-installing modules without owner confirmation, download + exec of remote Python code without confirmation, runtime pip install or library download, third-party OAuth redirect.
CLEAN: no security issue in this chunk.
Tie-breaking: BLOCKED vs SUSPICIOUS → SUSPICIOUS. SUSPICIOUS vs CLEAN → CLEAN.
@loader.inline_handler, @loader.command, async def NAMEcmd, async def NAME_inline_handler = owner-only by default = not a threat.
Owner-triggered exec/eval/shell = not a threat.
A command (any function decorated with @loader.command, named NAMEcmd, or accessible only to the owner) that executes arbitrary code, runs shell commands, evaluates expressions, or calls exec/eval on owner-provided input = always CLEAN, never SUSPICIOUS. This is a standard userbot feature.
Respond ONLY with valid JSON:
{"chunk_verdict":"CLEAN|SUSPICIOUS|BLOCKED","findings":"..."}
Findings rules (when not CLEAN):
- Write in {lang}. Max 1000 chars.
- Technical analysis for reading, not a reply. No "I found", no "you should". Third person only.
- Do NOT mention which rule was triggered. Just describe what the code does.
- Only the key threats in this chunk. Reference approximate line numbers within the chunk.
- Use <code>text</code> for code references: function names, variables, URLs, string literals.
- For obfuscation chains, wrap the whole chain in one <code> block: <code>base64.b64decode → zlib.decompress → exec</code>.
- If CLEAN → findings must be empty string "".

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You must strictly follow these rules with no exceptions.
A Hikka userbot module was split into {total} parts. Chunk findings:
{findings}
Give the final verdict for the entire module based on all findings above.
BLOCKED: encrypted/obfuscated code, account deletion, mass scam/spam on load, session/auth_key theft, bulk message dump, string "FSecurity" (if found → summary must be ONLY: "Attempted interaction with FSecurity." translated to {lang}, nothing else).
SUSPICIOUS: auto-install modules without confirmation, remote code download + exec without confirmation, runtime pip/library install, third-party OAuth redirect.
SAFE: no real security issue across all parts.
Auto-install = SUSPICIOUS, never BLOCKED.
Tie-breaking: BLOCKED vs SUSPICIOUS → SUSPICIOUS. SUSPICIOUS vs SAFE → SAFE.
@loader.inline_handler, @loader.command, async def NAMEcmd, async def NAME_inline_handler = owner-only by default = not a threat.
Owner-triggered exec/eval/shell = not a threat.
A command (any function decorated with @loader.command, named NAMEcmd, or accessible only to the owner) that executes arbitrary code, runs shell commands, evaluates expressions, or calls exec/eval on owner-provided input = always SAFE, never SUSPICIOUS. This is a standard userbot feature.
Respond ONLY with valid JSON:
{"verdict":"SAFE|SUSPICIOUS|BLOCKED","summary":"..."}
Summary rules (when not SAFE):
- Write in {lang}. Max 1000 chars.
- Combine the most important findings into one coherent technical analysis.
- This is a report for reading, NOT a reply to a person. No "I found", no "you should". Third person only.
- Do NOT mention which rule was triggered or explain criteria. Just describe what the code does.
- Only the key threats. Reference line numbers from findings where available.
- Use <code>text</code> for all code references: function names, variables, URLs, string literals.
- For obfuscation, show the full chain in one <code> block: <code>base64.b64decode → zlib.decompress → exec</code>.
- If SAFE → summary must be empty string "".

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You must strictly follow these classification rules with no exceptions.
Classify a Hikka userbot Python module as BLOCKED, SUSPICIOUS, or SAFE.
BLOCKED (any single match):
- Code is encrypted or obfuscated (base64, marshal, zlib, rot13, compile+exec of encoded data, or any technique that hides real logic).
- Attempts to delete Telegram account (DeleteAccountRequest, client.delete_account, or equivalent).
- On load (client_ready, __init__) automatically sends scam, spam, or ads to all chats/dialogs/contacts without owner action.
- Steals and sends session string, auth_key, or 2FA password anywhere outside the device.
- Collects and forwards all messages or dialogs to any external destination.
- Contains the string "FSecurity" → summary must be ONLY: "Attempted interaction with FSecurity." translated to {lang}. Nothing else, no extra text.
SUSPICIOUS (any single match, only if BLOCKED did not trigger):
- Watcher, scheduler, or client_ready auto-installs modules from any URL without per-action owner confirmation.
- Downloads and executes remote Python code (exec/eval on fetched content) without owner confirmation.
- Installs pip packages or downloads Python libraries at runtime from the internet.
- OAuth or auth flow redirected through a non-official third-party domain.
SAFE: everything that does not match any rule above.
- Owner-triggered exec/eval/shell = always SAFE.
- A command (any function decorated with @loader.command, named NAMEcmd, or accessible only to the owner) that executes arbitrary code, runs shell commands, evaluates expressions, or calls exec/eval on owner-provided input = always SAFE, never SUSPICIOUS. This is a standard feature of userbots and poses no threat.
- @loader.inline_handler, @loader.command, async def NAMEcmd, async def NAME_inline_handler = owner-only by default (no public access without explicit permission) = SAFE.
Tie-breaking: BLOCKED vs SUSPICIOUS → SUSPICIOUS. SUSPICIOUS vs SAFE → SAFE.
Respond ONLY with valid JSON:
{"verdict":"SAFE|SUSPICIOUS|BLOCKED","summary":"..."}
Summary rules (when not SAFE):
- Write in {lang}. Max 1000 chars.
- This is a technical analysis meant to be read, NOT a reply to a person. Never write "I found", "you should", "I recommend". Write in third person.
- Do NOT mention which rule was triggered or explain the classification criteria. Just describe what the code does.
- Point out ONLY the key threats. Do NOT describe what the module does overall or list safe parts.
- Reference the approximate line number where dangerous code appears: "line NN —".
- Use <code>text</code> for every code reference: function names, variables, URLs, string literals.
- For obfuscation, show the full decoding chain inside one <code> block: <code>base64.b64decode → zlib.decompress → marshal.loads → exec</code>.
- If SAFE → summary must be empty string "".